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ABSTRACT
This thesis has focused on the cryptanalysis of cryptographic primitives
especially stream ciphers which is an important topic in cryptography.
Additionally, the security of network coding is discussed and improved
with a new scheme.
First, a new statistical test, called Quadratic Box-Test, is presented. It
can be used to evaluate the randomness quality of the pseudorandom
sequences which can be the output of a cryptographic primitive. More-
over, it can be used as a distinguisher to attack stream ciphers, block
ciphers and hash functions.
In the second part of the thesis, some stream ciphers are analyzed
and some successful attacks are presented. A modiﬁed algebraic attack
is used against some clock controlled stream ciphers. In order to have
successful attacks, the modiﬁed algebraic attack is accompanied by
some new ideas. Moreover, the security of clock controlled stream
ciphers based on its jumping system is investigated and discussed
which resulted in some recommendations to design a clock controlled
stream cipher. Finally, a differential distinguishing attack based on a
fault attack is presented in this thesis to attack the Shannon stream
cipher.
The last part of this thesis focuses on the security of network coding
which promises increased efﬁciency for future networks. For secure
network coding, a new attack model is studied and the secrecy capacity
is improved by a concatenated secret sharing scheme.
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1 MOTIVATION
The history of cryptography begins thousands of years ago. The earli-
est known use of cryptography is found in non-standard hieroglyphs
carved into monuments from Egypt’s Old Kingdom (ca 4500+ years
ago). There are also many manuscripts in cryptography and crypt-
analysis written during the golden age of Islam. For example, two
philosophers during that age were Ahmad al-Qalqashandi and Al-Kindi
that contributed and published manuscripts in cryptography and crypt-
analysis.
The Subh al-a’sha is a 14-volume encyclopedia which includes a sec-
tion on cryptology and written by Ahmad al-Qalqashandi (1355-1418
AH). This work included a list of ciphers consisting of both substi-
tution and transposition, and for the ﬁrst time, a cipher with multiple
substitutions for each plaintext letter. Also traced to Ibn al-Duraihim is
an exposition and worked example of cryptanalysis, including the use
of tables of letter frequencies and sets of letters which do not appear
consecutively.
Around AD 800, Al-Kindi [1], an Arab mathematician, invented the
frequency analysis technique for breaking mono-alphabetic substitution
ciphers which was probably religiously motivated from textual analysis
of the Qur’an, the Islamic holy book. He wrote a book on cryptography
entitled Risalah ﬁ Istikhraj al-Mu’amma (Manuscript for the Deciphering
of Cryptographic Messages), in which he gave the ﬁrst descriptions on
frequency analysis. It is the ﬁrst documented occurrence of systematic
cryptanalysis techniques and also it includes some poly-alphabetic
ciphers, cipher classiﬁcation and most importantly describes the use
of several statistical techniques for cryptanalysis [57]. It also covered
methods of encipherments, cryptanalysis of certain encipherments, and
statistical analysis of letters and letter combinations in Arabic [1, 2].
Al-Kindi’s work was the most fundamental cryptanalytic advance until
WWII.
During WWII, Claude Shannon introduced his theory which was
the starting point of Modern Cryptography that evolved considerably as
a science. He published his theory in 1949 entitled “Communication
Theory of Secrecy Systems” which established a solid theoretical basis
for cryptography and also for cryptanalysis based on “information and
communication theory”.
Modern cryptography can be divided in two classes; symmetric and
asymmetric cryptography. In symmetric cryptography, sender and re-
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ceiver use the same key and it is more often used for transmitting larger
quantities of data than asymmetric cryptography where the sender and
receiver use different keys. Asymmetric cryptography is often used to
establish a secret key between the sender and receiver. In symmetric
cryptography, the security depends on the security of the common key,
e.g. cryptographic primitives (stream cipher, block cipher, hash function,
...).
Cryptographic primitives play the most important role in secure sys-
tem design as the basic blocks. Frequent use of cryptographic primitives
in military, governments and industries is the best evidence for their
importance. Due to their importance, there are several competitions
to standardize block ciphers, stream ciphers and hash functions. On
January 2, 1997, NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology
of the United States [50]) announced a competition for block cipher to
choose a successor to DES to be known as AES and it was completed
in October 2000. eSTREAM/ECRYPT was a project to identify a new
stream cipher as a standard and organized by the EU ECRYPT network
[22]. The NESSIE project [51] was its ancestor but all submitted can-
didates were rejected. The call for stream ciphers was ﬁrst issued in
November 2004 and completed in April 2008.
After my graduation in cryptography as a Master student, I started
my activity in cryptanalysis of stream ciphers in the eSTREAM project.
After some successful attacks on several candidates [31, 32, 42–44],
I started my PhD studies in 2007 and continued my cryptanalysis
experience. This resulted in some successful attacks on several stream
ciphers and these results are presented in my thesis.
Recently, there is another competition but this time for the primitive
“hash function” organized by NIST. It was formally announced on
November 2, 2007 and the proclamation of a winner and publication of
the new standard are scheduled to take place in 2012. This competition
was contemporaneous with my PhD study and I found a chance to
contribute to this topic and presented a new statistical test which can
be used as a distinguisher for hash functions and other primitives.
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2 BACKGROUND
There are many concepts in cryptography, but a brief overview of some
related topics to this thesis are given in this section. Readers who are
already familiar with these concepts can skip the corresponding parts.
2 .1 RANDOMNESS
One of the most important topics in cryptography is randomness and
randomness measurement. The security of most cryptographic systems
depends upon a random sequence. For example, the secret key in block
ciphers and stream ciphers, the primes p, q in RSA encryption and
digital signature schemes, the nonce in most authentication protocols.
In fact, producing a true random sequence is not possible or at least it is
very costly. Therefore a pseudorandom sequence is used in cryptography
instead.
A pseudorandom sequence is not a true random sequence, but it
should be indistinguishable from a true random sequence. There are
some properties that a pseudorandom sequence should fulﬁll to assure
its randomness. Golomb in [25] proposed three randomness postulates
to measure randomness of binary periodic sequences. For a sequence
S = s0, s1, ..., sN−1 with period N, the Golomb postulates are:
• R-1: In every period, the difference between the number of zeros
and the number of ones should not exceed 1.
• R-2: In every period, half the runs (consecutive 0’s or 1’s) have
length one, one-fourth have length two, one-eighth have length
three, etc., as long as the number of runs so indicted exceeds 1.
Moreover, for each of these lengths, there are equally many runs
of 0’s and 1’s.
• R-3: For the auto-correlation function C(τ) we have:
C(τ) =
{
N if τ ≡ 0 ( mod N )
K if τ ≡ 0 ( mod N ), (1)
where K is a constant and the auto-correlation function, C(τ), for
sequence S = s0, s1, ..., sN−1 is deﬁned by:
C(τ) =
N−1
∑
i=0
(−1)si+si+τ . (2)
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These properties are necessary for each pseudorandom sequence but
they are not sufﬁcient. Therefore more properties are deﬁned in the
literature. Randomness is a probabilistic property; that is, the properties
of a random sequence can be characterized and described in terms of
probability. To determine that a pseudorandom bit sequence fulﬁlls
these properties, we use statistical tests. Each statistical test measures
certain aspects of the quality of the sequence.
Fail to Reject H0
Reject H0
Critical Value
Critical X2
Fig. 1: Critical Value for χ2 Distribution.
There are many statistical tests which can be applied to a sequence to
compare and evaluate the randomness of the sequence. Because there
are so many tests for judging whether a sequence is random or not, no
speciﬁc ﬁnite set of tests is deemed “complete”. In addition, the results
of statistical testing must be interpreted with some care and caution to
avoid incorrect conclusions about a speciﬁc generator. Generally, if the
output of a sequence generator does not pass a statistical test, we can
conclude that there is a distinguisher for this generator which can lead
to a key recovery attack in some cases.
A statistical test is formulated to test a speciﬁc null hypothesis (H0)
which is “the sequence being tested is random” in cryptography. For
each applied test, a decision or conclusion is derived from acceptance
or rejection of the null hypothesis, i.e., whether the generator is (or is
not) producing random values, based on the produced sequence.
To design a new statistical test, a relevant randomness statistic must
be chosen and used to determine the acceptance or rejection of the null
hypothesis. Under an assumption of randomness, such a statistic has a
distribution of possible values which is determined by mathematical
methods under the null hypothesis. To apply a test, a statistic value
is computed on the tested data and compared to the critical value. If
the test statistic value exceeds the critical value, the null hypothesis for
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Table 1: The status of statistical results
TRUE SITUATION Conclusion
Accept H0 Accept Ha (reject H0)
Data is random (H0 is true) No error Type I error
Data is not random (Ha is true) Type II error No error
randomness is rejected. Otherwise, the null hypothesis (the randomness
hypothesis) is not rejected. Figure 1 illustrates the critical value and
rejection area for χ2 Distribution.
When the calculated test statistic value exceeds the critical value, it
means that the low probability event does in fact occur. But from a
statistical hypothesis testing point of view, the low probability event
should not occur naturally. Therefore, we can conclude that the origi-
nal assumption of randomness is suspect or faulty and the statistical
hypothesis testing yields; H0 (randomness) is rejected and Ha (non-
randomness) is accepted. Table 1 relates the true (unknown) status of
the data at hand to the conclusion arrived at using the testing procedure.
In statistical tests, Type I Error occurs when the null hypothesis is
rejected while the data is infact random. Additionally, Type II Error
occurs when the null hypothesis is accepted while the data is non-
random.
The probability of a type I error is often called the level of signiﬁcance
of the test and is denoted by α. So, α is the probability of a wrong result
in the test for a sequence while it really is random. That is, a sequence
appears to have non-random properties even when a “good” generator
produced the sequence.
The probability of a type II error is denoted as β which means a “bad”
generator produced a sequence that appears to have random properties.
Unlike α, β is not a ﬁxed value. β can take on many different values
because there are an inﬁnite number of ways that a data stream can be
non-random, and each different way yields a different β. The calculation
of the type II error, β, is more difﬁcult than the calculation of α because
of the many possible types of non-randomness. For designing a new
statistical test, one should prove that the new test is consistent when
the length of tested data goes to inﬁnity. For this, it should be shown
that β tends to zero when the length of tested data goes to inﬁnity.
In paper I, we proposed a new statistical test which is suitable to
apply to the output of all cryptographic primitives (e.g. hash function,
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block cipher, stream cipher, random number generator, ...), and we
proved that β goes to zero (i.e. the power of our test tends to one) when
the length of tested data goes to inﬁnity.
2 .2 STREAM CIPHER
The one-time pad (or Vernam) cipher is the only perfect secure system
which is unbreakable [56]. In this system, a new random symbol is pro-
duced independently from plaintext and previous symbols to encrypt
each symbol of the plaintext. Therefore, the length of the secret key
should be as long as the plaintext and it is hard to store and distribute
this key between the trusted users. Therefore, it is an impractical system.
In practice, we use an algorithm to produce a pseudorandom sequence
from a short secret key but as long as needed. The short secret key
can be produced and distributed easily by asymmetric key cryptogra-
phy and then the trusted users can produce the same pseudorandom
sequence to encrypt and decrypt messages.
Deﬁnition 1. A pseudorandom bit generator (PRBG) is a deterministic
algorithm which, given a truly random binary sequence of length k, outputs
a binary sequence of length l > k which “appears” to be random. The input
to the PRBG is called the seed, while the output of the PRBG is called a
pseudorandom bit sequence [48].
One approach to designing a pseudorandom bit generator is stream
ciphers. In cryptography, a stream cipher is a symmetric key cipher
which produces a sequence of pseudorandom bits depending on a secret
key (and usually an Initial Vector). This is combined with the plaintext
bit stream typically by an exclusive-or (XOR) operation. Figure 2 shows
the structure of a stream cipher. In contrast, a block cipher operates on
each block of plaintext and modiﬁes them depending on a secret key
(and usually an Initial Vector in CFB or OFB modes).
Stream ciphers are widely used due to their speed and simplicity in
hardware implementation and also they need lower power than other
primitives. The foremost and simplest element used to design a stream
cipher is a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) [25] which is usually
combined with a nonlinear element. LFSRs can generate sequences with
highly attractive properties in cryptography and can be implemented
efﬁciently in hardware and software. An LFSR contains n cells which
are shifted one cell in each step. The last cell is considered as an output
bit and the ﬁrst cell is modiﬁed depending on the value of others.
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Fig. 2: Structure of Stream Cipher.
In other words, if we denote the state of the register at time t− 1 by
St−1 = (st−1, st, ..., st+n−2), the next state St is determined by
St = (st, st+1, ...,
n−1
∑
i=0
cist+i−1). (3)
The weakness of an LFSR is its linearity. This can be ﬁxed by including
a nonlinear element. To use LFSRs in stream ciphers, there are several
well known approaches to include nonlinearity:
• Nonlinear Filter Generators: In this structure, the state of the
LFSR is passed through a nonlinear function to produce the out-
put sequence. We refer to [4, 48] for further details. The knapsack
generator is an example of a nonlinear ﬁlter generator.
• Nonlinear Combination Generators: Another approach to in-
clude a nonlinear element is the usage of a nonlinear function
to apply on the output of several parallel LFSRs. The Geffe gen-
erator [28] and Summation generator [53] are two examples of this
structure.
• Nonlinear Feedback Shift Registers: An other approach to de-
signing a nonlinear stream cipher is the use of a nonlinear boolean
function as a feedback for a shift register. In other words, instead
of using a linear combination in (3), to modify the ﬁrst cell, a non-
linear combination is used. Grain is an example using nonlinear
feedback shift registers [35].
• Clock-Controlled Generators: Using irregular clocking instead of
regular clocking in LFSR is another approach to include nonlinear-
ity. There are several different substructures for clock-controlled
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generators. We refer to [27] for further details. The Alternating Step
Generator [26] and Shrinking Generator [19, 49] are two examples
of this structure.
In papers II-IV, we present our results on attacks on several families
of the Alternating Step Generator. These are modiﬁed versions to resist
the previous attacks applied on the original alternating step generator.
2 .3 STREAM CIPHER CRYPTANALYSIS
Before using a stream cipher, its security should be proved and this is
often done by proving its immunity against all known attacks. There are
many attacks that apply to stream ciphers but a survey of two attacks
which are relevant to this thesis are given in this section.
2 .3 .1 ALGEBRAIC ATTACK ON STREAM CIPHERS
One powerful method of cryptanalysis is the algebraic attack [18, 45]
which has received a great deal of attention in the literature during the
last decade. This attack turns the problem of breaking the cipher into a
problem of solving an equation system and if it is sufﬁciently difﬁcult
to solve, we can consider that the cipher is secure against this attack.
In this technique, each output symbol, zt, for each clock t is repre-
sented as a polynomial in the initial state (or internal state) at the same
time. Then an equation system is constructed with the polynomials and
solved to ﬁnd the initial state (or internal state).
Of course, one can also try to use the knowledge of the internal
state to clock the stream cipher backwards and recover the secret key.
Depending on the type of equation system, there are several meth-
ods to solve it, like Gröbner Bases, Linearization (system needs to be
grossly overdeﬁned), XL, XLS etc. Also, we can reduce the degree of
equations according to our knowledge about the algorithm and reduce
the complexity of the attack.
There are many types of algebraic attacks on stream ciphers, block
ciphers and public key cryptosystems. We are interested in a version
of especially an algebraic attack that is applicable to stream ciphers
and to clock-controlled LFSR-based stream ciphers. In [3] an algebraic
attack approach to a family of clock-controlled LFSR-based systems is
presented. In this thesis, a similar approach combined with some new
ideas are used to cryptanalyze some clock-controlled generators related
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to the alternative step generator family. More details are presented in
papers II-IV.
2 .3 .2 DIFFERENTIAL ATTACK
Another general method for analyzing cryptographic primitives is dif-
ferential cryptanalysis introduced in [9, 10]. It is usually a kind of chosen
plaintext attack, meaning that encrypted ciphertexts can be obtained for
some set of chosen plaintexts. The technique was widely applied to
stream ciphers [6], block ciphers [8, 10], hash functions [52] and also
public key cryptosystems [20, 24], and most of the new constructions
are speciﬁcally designed to resist this attack.
The basic idea uses a pair of plaintexts which are related by a constant
difference, (Δx). The exclusive-or (XOR) operation is usually considered
to ﬁnd the difference, but it can be deﬁned in several ways depending
on the algorithm. The attacker then calculates the difference of corre-
sponding ciphertexts, (Δy). The resulting pair of differences (Δx, Δy) is
called a differential. We are not interested in what exactly happens in the
cipher when the desired differential occurs, but only interested in the
probability of the differential. If the differences of the corresponding
ciphertexts has any statistical patterns in their distribution, the cipher
can be distinguished from random and it can lead to a key recovery
attack. A differential of a stream cipher is a prediction that a given
input difference (Key, IV or the internal state) produces some speciﬁc
output differences (Key stream or internal state).
The differential attack can be used with fault analysis [7] which has
several modes. In fault attacks, introduced by Boneh et al. in 1997 [11],
the attacker can introduce errors during the computation, leading to an
error in the output. The errors can be injected in several ways(e.g. X-ray,
laser light, ion beams, ... ) and in many places according to the algorithm.
By examining the difference between an unfaulty computation and a
faulty one, the attacker can deduce information on the computation.
Excellent surveys on fault attacks can be found in [5, 29]. Differential
fault attacks were used in various cryptanalytic attacks on stream
ciphers [7] which is relevant to our work.
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2.4 SECURE NETWORK CODING
Network coding was introduced by Ahlswede et al. in [12]. In this com-
munication paradigm, network nodes are allowed not only to forward
unmodiﬁed packets, as routers in a classical store-and-forward network
are restricted to, but also to modify packets by performing mathematical
operations to form new packets prior to forwarding them.
In [17], Cai and Yeung presented a certain security problem that
can be alleviated by network coding. They introduced a model for
secure linear network coding based on using secret sharing idea that
achieved perfect information security against a wiretapper with access
to a limited number of network links.
In [23], Feldman et al. showed that ﬁnding a matrix for the construc-
tion of an optimal secure network code is equivalent to ﬁnding a linear
code with certain generalized distance properties and improved the
lower bound of the ﬁeld size. In this model, increasing the level of
security results in the growth of the required ﬁeld size which leads to
an inefﬁcient model in practice.
In [47], Lima et al. considered a different approach to provide secure
network coding. They showed that linear network coding is sufﬁcient to
set up a secure network coding scheme when a network is constructed
by imposing a limitation on the input degree of the nodes.
In this thesis, a new model, named Two Layer Secure Network Coding
or 2-LSNC, for secure network coding is proposed. By this model, we
improve on the number of links that a wiretapper needs to access in
order to extract the secret message, the level of security and the cost for
increasing the level of security. Our model is scalable, which means that
the efﬁciency improves as network size grows while our simulations
shows that this property does not hold for previous approaches. In
other words, resistance against a more powerful wiretapper in [17] and
[47] can be achieved by using a larger ﬁeld size. Our method has no
constraint on the ﬁeld size and it is only necessary to use a ﬁeld that
gives a feasible network coding solution.
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2.5 SECRET SHARING
In cryptography, secret sharing refers to any method for distributing a
secret (with a dealer) amongst a group of n participants (players), each
of which is allocated a share of the secret. Secret sharing was invented
independently in 1979 by A. Shamir [55] and G. Blakley [13]. The
secret can be reconstructed only when a sufﬁcient number of shares
are combined together. In basic concept, (n,t)-scheme, the secret S is
divided into n shares (s1, . . . , sn) in such a way that:
1. Knowledge of any t or more si makes S easily computable.
2. Knowledge of any t − 1 or fewer si leaves S completely undeter-
mined.
For example, in the trivial (n, n)-threshold scheme (i.e. t is equal to
n), n− 1 random numbers (r1, . . . , rn−1) are generated as n− 1 shares
and for the last share we have: rn = S⊕ r1 ⊕ r2 ⊕ . . .⊕ rn−1, where ⊕
is any discrete formal addition. It is straightforward to see that S could
be reconstructed with knowledge of all shares, while no subset of n− 1
or fewer shares can reconstruct the secret S.
In [55] a simple (n, t)-threshold scheme based on polynomial interpo-
lation is proposed where the polynomials can be replaced by any other
collection of functions which are easy to evaluate and to interpolate.
This technique is an important method used to distribute a secret key
in symmetric cryptography. However, there are many different methods
for secret sharing in the literature, and a new method suitable for secret
network coding is presented in this thesis.
3 SUMMARY OF PAPERS
This thesis consists of eight papers. In the following sections, a short
overview of each paper is given.
3 .1 PAPER I : NEW STATIST ICAL BOX-TEST AND ITS POWER
In the ﬁrst paper, we propose a new statistical box-test whose main
idea is to compare the distribution of repeated patterns in a given
sequence which can be the output of any cryptographic primitive. By a
hypothesis test, this distribution in the tested data is compared with its
expected value in a true random sequence.
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The basic idea comes from the Empty Box Test which was proposed by
David in [21]. Let μ0 denotes the number of patterns that never appear
in the tested sequence. In the case of a true random sequence, the
variable μ0 has a normal distribution and the empty box test evaluates
the normality of μ0. To the best of our knowledge it is the ﬁrst time that
this notion is used in cryptography. We also extended this idea to drive
several tests based on μr for r ≥ 0. Additionally, we proposed a new
statistical test based on a nonlinear combination of μr for r ≥ 0.
3 .2 PAPER II - IV: ALGEBRAIC ATTACKS ON SOME MODIF IED
VERSIONS OF THE ALTERNATING STEP GENERATOR
From a cryptanalysis point of view, a good stream cipher should be
resistant against a known-plaintext attack. In this kind of attack, the
cryptanalyst is given a plaintext and the corresponding ciphertext, and
the task is to determine the secret key. For a synchronous stream cipher,
this is equivalent to the problem of ﬁnding the secret key or initial state
that produces a given keystream output.
In papers II-IV, some modiﬁed versions of the Alternating Step Gener-
ator (ASG) are discussed and analyzed. An alternating step generator,
a well-known stream cipher proposed in [26], consists of three linear
feedback shift registers, A, B and C, whose lengths are l, m and n re-
spectively. The ﬁrst LFSR, A, is clocked regularly and the two others,
B and C, are clocked in a Stop/Go manner [15, 27]. At each time, the
clock-control bit from A determines which one of the two Stop/Go
LFSRs is clocked, and the output sequence is obtained as a bit-wise
sum of the two Stop/Go clocked LFSR sequences. Figure 3 shows the
simple structure of the original Alternating Step Generator.
In all these papers, we used a modiﬁed version of algebraic attack
combined with a new idea in each paper to reduce the complexity
of our attack on a speciﬁc class of the ASG family. In all papers, we
search over all possible initial states of the regularly clocked binary
LFSR, A, and calculate some equations based on unknown initial states
of the irregularly clocked binary LFSRs, B and C, and known output
keystream sequence to construct an equation system. In the original
concept of the algebraic attack, we have to solve this equation system,
but we guess a bit of LFSR B and ﬁnd an irregular output of each
LFSR, B and C, with a quite low complexity. By using the irregular
outputs found in the ﬁrst part of the attack, we ﬁnd the initial states
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of the LFSRs, B and C, which is done in different ways in each paper
presented brieﬂy in the following subsections.
Fig. 3: Structure of the original Alternating Step Generator (ASG).
3.2 .1 PAPER II : ALGEBRAIC ATTACK ON THE ALTERNATING
STEP(r, s) GENERATOR
The Alternating Step(r, s) Generator [40], ASG(r, s), is a clock-controlled
sequence generator proposed in 2002. This is similar to the original
alternating step generator with one exception; the registers B (resp.
C) are clocked r times (or not clocked) (resp. s times or not clocked)
depending on the clock-control bit from the ﬁrst register. The designer
claimed there is no efﬁcient attack against the ASG(r, s) since r and s
are kept secret. Figure 4 illustrates the structure of ASG(r, s).
Fig. 4: Structure of the Alternating Step(r, s) Generator (ASG(r, s)).
Our contribution in this paper is a new model for ASG(r, s) which
is independent of the secret parameters r and s which can reproduce
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the same output but with a different initial state. We apply our efﬁcient
algebraic attack on this model instead of the original algorithm. Using
our result from applying our attack on this model, we can ﬁnd the secret
key as well as parameters r and s. In total, our attack needs 3(m+ n) bits
of the output sequence to ﬁnd the secret key with O((m2 + n2)2l+1 +
m32m−1 + n32n−1) computational complexity. We show that this system
is no more secure than the original ASG, in contrast to what was claimed
by the ASG(r, s)’s constructor.
3 .2 .2 PAPER II I : ALGEBRAIC ATTACK ON THE MORE
GENERALIZED ASG AND MODIF IED ASG
The More Generalized Clock-Controlled Alternating Step Generator
[41], MGASG, is a clock-controlled sequence generator proposed in
2004. It is similar to the original alternating step generator with one
exception; at each time unit t, the registers B (resp. C) clocked r(t)
times or not clocked (resp. s(t) times or not clocked) depending on the
clock-control bits in the ﬁrst register. At each time t, the values of r(t)
and s(t) are determined according to the values of WB and WC bits
of the ﬁrst register respectively. The special case when (r(t) = r) and
(s(t) = s) is the Alternating Step(r, s) Generator discussed in paper II,
and the special case when r(t) = s(t) = 1 is the original Alternating
Step Generator. Again the designer claimed that there is no efﬁcient
attack against the MGASG since the positions of controller bits and the
values of the parameters WB and WC are kept secret and therefore, r(t)
and s(t) are unknown. The structure of this algorithm is illustrated in
Figure 5.
Fig. 5: Structure of the More Generalized Clock-Controlled Alternating Step Generator.
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The Modiﬁed Clock-Controlled Alternating Step Generator, MASG,
proposed in 2009, is similar to the More Generalized Clock-Controlled
Alternating Step Generator [41], MGASG, with one exception; the out-
put keystream is produced by a bit wise sum of the output keystream
of all three registers instead of only two irregular registers. Figure 6
illustrates the structure of this algorithm.
Fig. 6: Structure of the Modiﬁed Clock-Controlled Alternating Step Generator.
Our contribution in this paper is the combination of MAP Decoding
on the Deletion Channel presented by Johansson in [39] and our modiﬁed
algebraic attack to achieve an applicable attack on these structures. Our
attack on these structures use a few bits of the output sequence to ﬁnd
the secret key with a computational complexity of O(lM22M+l+6(WB +
WC)) while M = max(m, n). In the case of m = n = l = 64 and
WB = WC = 8, our attack can ﬁnd the secret key using 512 output bits
and a complexity of O(2156) steps, while the author claims that the best
attack needs O(2665.8) steps and the exhaustive search needs O(2774.8)
steps. The designer of MASG claims that the LCT attack needs O(2669.5)
steps for our example.
3 .2 .3 PAPER IV: ALGEBRAIC ATTACK ON THE SECOND CLASS
OF MODIF IED ALTERNATINGk-GENERATORS
Alternating k-generators [16] is a family of binary clock-controlled
keystream generators which ﬁxes the weaknesses of the previous al-
ternating step generator’s families by inserting a nonlinear element
in three ways and proposes three different classes. In this paper, we
discuss the second class of modiﬁed alternatingk-generators. This gen-
erator is similar to the original ASG structure with one exception; the
controller bit is produced by applying a nonlinear boolean function
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on the internal state of the controller LFSR, A. This algorithm is illus-
trated in Figure 7. The designer proposed another stronger version of
this structure by changing the output function. In the stronger version,
instead of two LFSRs, the output of all three LFSRs are combined to
produce the output keystream.
In this paper, we applied our algebraic attack combined with the
Berlekamp-Massey algorithm on both versions of the modiﬁed alter-
nating k-generators. The computational complexity of our attack is
O(2l+1(m2 + n2)) (resp. O(2l+1)) if the feedback polynomials of the
generating registers are unknown (resp. known).
Johansson’s attack is the best previous attack which can be applied on
this structure and its complexity is less than the complexity of our attack,
but it needs many more keystream bits. Additionally, if the feedback
polynomial of the controlled registers are unknown, Johansson’s attack
(and also all previous attacks) is not applicable, but our attack can
be applied. Our results show that the security of the second class of
k-generators is not better than the security of the original alternating
step generator against our algebraic attack.
Fig. 7: Structure of the second class of modiﬁed alternatingk-generators.
3.3 PAPER V: SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE STEP(D ,K)
GENERATOR WITH RESPECT TO ITS PARAMETERS
Ciphers based on an irregularly clocked LFSR are one of the main and
widely used types of stream ciphers. The simplest scheme uses only
two LFSRs; the ﬁrst one is clocked regularly and its output controls the
clocking of the second one which produces irregular output sequence.
In general, the second register is clocked D or K times which is called a
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Step(D,K) Generator and illustrated in Figure 8. Most of the well known
clock-controlled structures are special cases of the Step(D,K) Generator,
e.g. Stop/Go generator is a Step(0,1) Generator.
In this paper, we discuss the security of the Step(D,K) Generator with
respect to its parameters D and K. We will calculate the probability,
P(n), that the nth bit of the regular sequence, generated by the second
LFSR, appears in the irregular output sequence. We will show that if
P(n) is zero for some values of n, we can reduce the time complexity
of the general attacks. In the case of the correlation attack based on
the Levenshtein Distance[30], we will show how we can improve the
time complexity of the attack. Finally, some recommendations will be
presented to answer the question of choosing good parameters.
Fig. 8: Structure of the Step(D,K) Generator.
3.4 PAPER VI : DIFFERENTIAL DISTINGUISHING ATTACK ON
THE SHANNON STREAM CIPHER BASED ON FAULT
ANALYSIS
The Shannon stream cipher was proposed by Philip Hawkes et al. [33]
as a software-efﬁcient algorithm, with key length up to 256 bits. The
Shannon stream cipher is an entirely new design, inﬂuenced by mem-
bers of the SOBER family stream cipher [34]. It consists of a single
nonlinear feedback shift register of length 16 with 32-bit words in each
cell. There is also an extra word, which is supplemented for message au-
thentication with 32 parallel CRC-16 registers. The keystream generator
part of the Shannon stream cipher is illustrated in Figure 9.
The contribution of this paper is proposing a differential distinguisher
for the Shannon stream cipher and ﬁnding a new weakness for the
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Fig. 9: Structure of the Shannon Stream Cipher.
nonlinear function used in the keystream generator. The distinguisher’s
complexity is four times the complexity of running the Shannon stream
cipher and our attack only needs two differential outputs for a successful
attack with error probability equal to 0.001. Another contribution of this
paper is using the fault analysis method for distinguishing the output
of the Shannon stream cipher.
3 .5 PAPER VII : TWO LAYER SECURE NETWORK CODING -
(2-LSNC)
Two important parameters for network users are security and cost of
network resource utilization. From the cost perspective, network coding
promises a higher gain compared to ordinary routing. In this paper,
a new model for secure network coding is proposed. This model is
named Two Layer Secure Network Coding or 2-LSNC. The advantage of
our new model is three-fold: 1) The number of links required for the
wiretapper to extract the secret is increased. 2) For scalability analysis
we have established a metric called level of security, and we demonstrate
that our model scales well with respect to this metric. 3) The tradeoff
between the cost and the level of security is analyzed. In our model,
this cost is lower than in Cai and Yeung’s model [17] when the network
size and the number of sinks reaches a critical point. Our approach is
compared with other models by simulation.
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3.6 PAPER VIII : WIRETAPPING BASED ON NODE CORRUPTION
OVER SECURE NETWORK CODING: ANALYSIS AND
OPTIMIZATION
A new type of attack on secure network coding is introduced in this
paper. In this model, network nodes, which handle the trafﬁc from the
source node to sink nodes are potentially viewed to be corruptible. We
study the maximum security capacity for this problem for a single-
source single-sink scenario, and we generalize our study for multicast
with network coding. Based on our study, two optimization problems
are introduced to increase the security against the attacks under study.
We have shown by simulation results that our proposed optimization
method has increased the security against node corruption considerably,
and at the same time, the cost per level of security is lower compared
to optimization methods without constraints on node corruption.
4 FUTURE RESEARCH
• In Paper I, a new statistical test is presented. In this paper, we
showed that about one-third of the output blocks occur more than
one time and the same proportion of the output patterns do not
occur at all in the output. In the case of hash functions, this idea
may help to reduce the complexity of ﬁnding a collision or second
pre-image. Therefore, this can be a future topic for research.
• In Paper II-IV, an algebraic attack on the several families of Alter-
nating Step Generator are presented. Our attack was applicable
due to the linearity of the output function in all analyzed al-
gorithms. Finding an attack when a nonlinear function is used
to produce the output sequence can be another topic for future
research.
• In Paper V, we discuss the security of the step(D,K) generator
with respect to its parameters. Recently, Jump Register [37, 38] is
used in some famous stream ciphers, e.g. Pomaranch [36] and
Mickey [14] stream ciphers. The last topic that we propose for
future work is investigation of the applicability of this idea on
jump registers and then on the Pomaranch and Mickey stream
ciphers.
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